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 Can Public Leadership Increase Public Service Motivation and Job 
Performance? 
 
Abstract  
To advance our understanding of leadership in the public sector, we study the link between 
accountability, rule-following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership and 
employees’ public service motivation (PSM) and individual job performance. Using a sample 
of 300 civil servants and their 64 managers in China, we found that accountability, rule-
following, political loyalty, and network governance approaches to leadership are all 
significantly positively related to employees’ PSM levels and job performance. The results of 
multilevel modeling show that network governance leadership had the strongest positive 
relationship with both PSM and job performance, suggesting that managers should encourage 
public employees to initiate and maintain contacts outside their organizations to access 
relevant information, technical expertise, and resources that may be not be available 
internally.  
 
Evidence for Practice 
• Our study shows evidence of the distinctiveness of four public leadership approaches: 
accountability leadership, rule-following leadership, political loyalty leadership, and 
network governance leadership. 
• All four public leadership approaches are positively related to PSM and increase job 
performance. 
• Network governance leadership is most strongly related to PSM and follower job 
performance. 
 
Key Words: Public leadership, public service motivation, performance, China.  
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There have been many important studies that demonstrate that leadership can increase both 
individual and organizational performance in public agencies (e.g., Bellé 2014; Jacobsen and 
Andersen 2015; Oberfield 2014). Research on leadership in public sector organizations has 
also made substantial contributions to the leadership literature at large. Max Weber (1947) 
conceptualized charismatic leadership based on his work on bureaucracies. James MacGregor 
Burns (1978) originated transformational leadership in his path-breaking study of political 
leadership. Ospina (2017) and Van Wart (2013) noted that the study of public sector 
leadership continues to have much to offer for other sectors as public managers face some of 
society’s most pressing challenges and wicked problems defying easy answers (Weber and 
Khademian 2008), such as global warming, environmental degradation, and migration. 
Instead of ignoring the publicness of the context and focusing on leadership rather 
than public leadership (Vogel and Masal 2015), some researchers have developed new 
leadership constructs to examine the characteristic features associated with the public setting. 
Following earlier work by Fernandez (2005) and Fernandez, Cho, and Perry (2010) on 
integrative leadership, Tummers and Knies (2016) introduced four approaches to public 
leadership: accountability leadership (justifying actions to stakeholders), rule-following 
leadership (acting in accordance with regulations), political loyalty leadership (advancing the 
will of politicians), and network governance leadership (connecting with others). While this 
was an important step in establishing that leaders within the public sector have different roles 
than those in the private sector, our article extends this work by analyzing the relationship of 
public leadership with two key constructs in the public administration literature: public 
service motivation (PSM) and performance (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise 2010).  
 PSM has been a cornerstone of public management research since Perry and Wise's 
(1990) seminal work (Ritz, Brewer, and Neumann 2016). Defined as “a particular form of 
altruism or prosocial motivation that is animated by specific dispositions and values arising 
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from public institutions and missions” (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise 2010, 682), PSM has 
been shown in past research to be a key mechanism that explains how leaders influence 
employees’ job performances in the public sector (Paarlberg and Lavigna 2010). Based on 
social learning theory (Bandura 1977), Wright, Hassan, and Park (2016) argued that public 
sector leaders act as role models for employees to emulate the attitudes and behaviors they 
communicate and encourage. Similarly, we argue that the public leadership approaches are 
positively related to employees’ PSM and job performance as public leaders model different 
types of positive public service behaviors when they adopt different leadership approaches 
(e.g., accountability leadership encourages civil servants to explain their actions to citizens).  
Whereas Vogel and Masal (2015) noted that the vast majority of empirical public 
leadership studies have been conducted in the Anglo-American context, we use a sample of 
300 civil servants and their 64 supervisors from a water resource bureau and an 
environmental bureau in China. Public leadership and performance improvements are clearly 
required in this context as recent studies estimate that more than half of the 1.4 billion 
Chinese citizens drink contaminated water (Yu et al. 2015) and that there are more than one 
million air pollution-related premature deaths per year in China (Zhao et al. 2019). While the 
recent major amendments to the Chinese Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law and 
the Environmental Protection Law delegated more authority to environmental protection 
officers to discipline the polluters, implementation of the laws has been poor and has not lead 
to the desired improvements (Hart, Jiayan, and Jiahui 2018). 
We argue that by adopting the four public leadership approaches, supervisors in the 
public sector become role models for employees to follow and emulate, which may have a 
positive impact on employees’ PSM and, in turn, is related to employee job performance. In 
doing so, we make three main contributions. First, extending the original work by Tummers 
and Knies (2016), this is the first study to analyze the links between the four public 
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leadership approaches and PSM and job performance. Second, we build on the PSM and job 
performance literature (Warren and Chen 2013) by examining potential public leadership 
antecedents of both constructs and do so in a rigorous methodological manner. To overcome 
methodological shortcomings, our study uses independently collected data sources, with 
public leadership and PSM rated by the employees and their job performance rated by their 
direct supervisors across three different time points. We also test our hypotheses using 
multilevel modeling. Third, by focusing on the role-modeling potential of public leadership 
behaviors, we extend the use of social learning theory (Bandura 1977) to explain the process 
by which leaders in the public sector may influence their followers’ job performance through 
enhancing their PSM.  
This article will first introduce the four public leadership approaches and demonstrate 
their importance in the public sector. Following this, we review the literature on PSM and job 
performance and develop our hypotheses accordingly. After describing the data collection 
methods and empirical context of our study, we analyze the distinctness of the measures and 
present the results of our multilevel hypothesis tests. Finally, after discussing the findings and 
implications of the study, we outline potential future research for public leadership.  
 
Theory and Hypothesis Development 
Public Leadership  
To gain a better understanding of public leadership and its influence on followers, Van Wart 
(2003) suggested that comprehensive models be developed that combine various leadership 
theories and approaches. Following Fernandez (2005), Fernandez, Cho, and Perry (2010) 
designed and tested an integrated five-factor leadership model that included task-, relations-, 
change-, diversity-, and integrity-oriented leadership and found a significant relationship 
between integrated leadership and federal program performance. 
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 Whereas components of the integrated leadership model were based on private-sector 
research, Tummers and Knies (2016) highlighted four public leadership roles that are 
particularly relevant in public organizations. The first three roles (accountability, rule-
following, and political loyalty) are bureaucracy-specific approaches that relate to the 
leaders’ obligations under this system. The fourth (network governance) was added due to the 
importance of managing networks and the prominence that networks are gaining in the public 
sector (e.g., Agranoff 2007). Tummers and Knies (2016) argued that a leader could move 
from one role to another depending on the situation and that these four approaches were sub-
dimensions of a larger ‘public leadership’ construct. These sub-dimensions as well as their 
relation to PSM will be described in detail in the next section. 
 
Public Leadership and Public Service Motivation  
PSM theory represents an alternative to the rational choice theories that suggest that people’s 
behavior is solely based on their self-interest (Perry and Wise 1990). Instead, PSM theory 
argues that human behavior is driven not only by self-concern but also by altruistic and other-
regarding motives with the purpose of doing good for society (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise 
2010). Following Perry’s (1996) seminal work, PSM is usually composed of four dimensions 
(Kim and Vandenabeele 2010; Kim et al. 2013). Attraction to public participation refers to a 
desire to do public work and to contribute to the public policy process based on instrumental 
motives. Commitment to public values is a disposition to uphold commonly held values, such 
as equal opportunities and ethical behavior, due to value-based motives. Compassion 
represents a concern for particular groups or people in need based on identification and 
affective motives. Finally, self-sacrifice places the good of society above personal 
advancement, emphasizing the altruistic and pro-social roots of PSM.  
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In recent public administration research, the behaviors of direct supervisors have been 
explored as an important antecedent to employees’ PSM (Paarlberg and Lavigna 2010). For 
example, Wright, Hassan, and Park (2016, 651) found that ethical leadership behaviors from 
the direct supervisor had a positive effect on employees’ PSM, arguing that ethical leaders 
“communicate, encourage, and hold subordinates accountable for ethical and unethical 
conduct” and through this process, employees who exhibit ethical behavior are more likely to 
be rewarded by the leader. Similarly, Schwarz and colleagues (2016) demonstrated that 
servant leadership increased employees’ PSM by emphasizing to employees the importance 
of serving the community at large. Both examples given draw on social learning theory 
(Bandura 1977) to explain the relationship between leadership behaviors and PSM. Social 
learning theory purports that individuals learn required and appropriate behaviors at work 
through watching and emulating credible role models. The supervisor is often seen as a 
credible role model due to his or her position and/or because he or she exhibits positive 
behaviors that employees believe are worth emulating.  
  Accountability leadership promotes dialogue and encourages employees to justify 
their actions to their wider stakeholders, including politicians, citizens, and nongovernmental 
organizations (Roberts 2003). Accountable leaders encourage employees to be open and 
honest with their internal and external stakeholders and keep them informed of their progress 
and decisions. In doing so, they demonstrate a commitment to public values that emphasizes 
ethical behavior and equality (Mulgan 2000). Kim et al. (2013) list accountability among the 
commonly held public values that highly public service motivated individuals pursue. Civil 
servants also display self-sacrifice when they are transparent about their actions even if it 
hurts them.  
Rule-following leaders encourage rule-driven behavior that is trans-situational and not 
actor-specific (Klijn and Koppenjan 2016), urge employees to adhere to governmental rules 
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and regulations, and take active steps in ensuring that these are followed (Tummers and 
Knies 2016). Rule-following leaders foster PSM in employees by role modeling how 
following government policies and laws can contribute to the public good, building on key 
areas of PSM, such as attraction to public participation, commitment to public values, and 
self-sacrifice (Tummers and Knies 2016). Perry (2000, 484) noted that “a respect for rules 
may be closely associated with the desire to obtain the common good.”  
Political loyalty leadership is defined as motivating employees to follow through on 
politicians’ decisions, even when they are costly to them. Tummers and Knies (2016) argue 
that there is a principal-agent relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976) between politicians 
and civil servants and that civil servants (agents) are responsible for delivering on promises 
made by politicians (principals). Leaders with high levels of political loyalty encourage and 
reward employees for following through on policy directives even when they personally 
disagree and or if a bill negatively affects their own department (Heidari-Robinson 2017). 
Managers who display political loyalty leadership behaviors demonstrate to their employees 
that they are committed to the public sector and the politicians, even if it means making 
sacrifices for the public interest (Tummers and Knies 2016). The idea of self-sacrifice for the 
public good is a tenet of the PSM literature (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise. 2010) and has 
been described as “the footing on which PSM rests” (Kim and Vandenabeele 2010, 704).  
Finally, network governance leadership is shown when public leaders actively 
encourage employees to network and connect with various stakeholders within their own 
organization and in the wider community (Tummers and Knies 2016). Although not a 
traditional public administrative role, this leadership approach has gained importance due to 
the increase in collaborations across departments and partnerships with private sector and 
nonprofit organizations to solve wicked problems (Mosley and Jarpe 2019) characterized by 
substantive, strategic, and institutional complexities that defy artificially created jurisdictional 
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and organizational boundaries (Kettl 2006; Klijn and Koppenjans 2016). These leaders 
expand employees’ network and knowledge of who their stakeholders actually are, which 
helps employees to put faces to the departments, agencies, and communities they serve. 
Therefore, employees are able to see how, for example, protecting water resources and air 
quality benefits the broader public, and this helps fuel their prosocial and altruistic 
motivations (Perry, Hondeghem, and Wise 2010). Previous research showed that PSM is 
strongly related to social impact perceptions (Bellé 2014).  
Taken together, we expect that the display of each of the four public leadership 
approaches should be related to follower PSM. This leads us to the following:  
 Hypothesis 1a: Accountability leadership will be positively related to follower PSM. 
Hypothesis 1b: Rule-following leadership will be positively related to follower PSM. 
Hypothesis 1c: Political loyalty leadership will be positively related to follower PSM. 
Hypothesis 1d: Network governance leadership will be positively related to follower 
PSM. 
 
Public Leadership, Public Service Motivation, and Job Performance 
The link between effective leadership and follower performance has been well established in 
the literature, demonstrating that when leaders provide vision, motivation, and support to 
their followers, followers reciprocate in kind with higher levels of performance (Paarlberg 
and Lavigna 2010). We expect that the four public leadership approaches will have similar 
results.  
Accountable leadership demonstrates to employees the importance of being 
transparent and keeping stakeholders regularly informed of the decisions that they make. On 
an institutional level, Han (2019) found that accountability was significantly related to 
agency performance. A high level of accountability to internal and external stakeholders 
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should translate into higher job performance as employees should be motivated to work hard 
and strive to avoid mistakes because they know that their work will be monitored (Mulgan 
2000).  
Rule-following leadership emphasizes adherence to processes and procedures. These 
policies show employees what is expected and provide them with the tools and knowledge to 
complete their jobs. March and Olsen (2008, 695) observed that “rules, for example, increase 
action capabilities and efficiency – the ability to solve policy problems and produce 
services.” Providing employees with clear direction and assistance should enable employees 
to better complete their tasks to required standards. 
Political loyalty leadership emphasizes that employees should align their actions with 
political interests, even if it is costly for them (Tummers and Knies 2013). Hong and Kim 
(2019) found that political principals reward civil servants’ loyalist behavior if accompanied 
by acceptable levels of performance. Following government priorities can be expected to 
increase performance as it prevents employees from engaging in counterproductive activities 
that are not aligned with other initiatives and facilitates the coordination of multiple 
simultaneous activities (March and Olsen 2008).  
Finally, network governance leadership should be related to employees’ performance 
as the leader actively encourages employees to maintain and expand their networks and 
leverage such networks to complete tasks, collaborate, and deliver on governmental promises 
(Klijn and Koppenjan 2016). Supervisors who encourage their employees to build and 
maintain contacts outside their department and organization enable them to access relevant 
information, technical expertise, and resources that may be not be available inside their 
departments and to work together with, e.g., private and nonprofit organizations, which 
should translate into better results (Hall and Battaglio 2018).  
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We argue that the relationships between the four public leadership approaches and 
employee job performance will be partially mediated by employees’ PSM. We argue for a 
partial, rather than a full, mediation, as we acknowledge that there are multiple attitudinal and 
situational factors that exist in this relationship. Proposition 2 in Perry and Wise's (1990, 370) 
original work on PSM stated that “in public service organizations, PSM is positively related 
to individual performance.” Perry and Wise (1990) suggested that the relationship between 
PSM and job performance occurred because individuals who possess PSM see the public 
work they are doing as highly meaningful. As individuals are able to do what they perceive as 
meaningful work and live out their values and convictions on a daily basis, this, in turn, 
should be positively related to an increase in job performance. Numerous studies have 
examined the connection between PSM and performance (Warren and Chen 2013; Schott, 
Van Cleef, and Steen 2015), with the overwhelming majority of studies finding a positive 
relationship (e.g., Andersen, Heinesen, and Pedersen 2014; Bellé 2013; Schwarz et al. 2016). 
Therefore, as highlighted earlier, given that the four public leadership roles should be 
positively related to PSM and that PSM should be positively related to follower job 
performance, we argue that PSM will act as a partial mediator between the public leadership 
roles and the job performance of public sector employees.  
Hypothesis 2a: PSM will mediate the relationship between accountability leadership 
and follower job performance. 
Hypothesis 2b: PSM will mediate the relationship between rule-following leadership 
and follower job performance. 
Hypothesis 2c: PSM will mediate the relationship between political loyalty 
leadership and follower job performance. 
Hypothesis 2d: PSM will mediate the relationship between network governance 
leadership and follower job performance. 
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Public Leadership and Public Service Motivation in a Chinese Water and 
Environmental Context  
Home to one-fifth of the world’s population, China possesses less than 6% of the global 
water resources (Yu et al. 2015). The increasingly serious shortfalls and challenges are 
exacerbated by uneven spatial and temporal water distribution and pollution from the rapid 
economic development that transformed China into the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse 
gases (Hart, Jiayan, and Jiahui 2019). In this context, the four public leadership approaches 
are very relevant to combating environmental degradation. 
Accountability leadership is necessary because Chinese public administration aims at 
becoming more transparent and accessible to society (Jing 2010). The Chinese Information 
Transparency Ordinance, for example, makes the responsibilities, procedures, and 
performance of civil servants public and allows citizens to hold them accountable for their 
decisions when standards are not met (Xue and Liou 2012). Provincial leaders are 
increasingly held accountable for meeting environmental targets in addition to the traditional 
focus on economic growth that provided performance legitimacy to the Communist Party 
(Hart, Jiayan, and Jiahui 2019). 
While “the traditional Chinese public administration was not a system of rule of law” 
(Jing 2010, 45), due processes were strengthened through the enactment of several 
administrative procedural regulations, which make rule-following leadership more important. 
To reverse the traditional weak and selective enforcement of water-related and environmental 
laws (Linster and Yang 2018), rule-following leaders emphasize the importance of executing 
legislation consistently. In their study on rule abidance among Chinese frontline officers, 
Zang and Musheno (2017) found that the majority were rule followers. Rule following 
ensures predictability and prevents abuses of power and corruption that can seriously hurt the 
government’s legitimacy and threaten the one-party rule (Zhu, Huang, and Zhang 2019).  
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Political loyalty leadership is relevant because the Chinese constitution recognizes 
the Communist Party’s political leadership over all branches of government, and civil 
servants are expected to serve their political masters unconditionally (Jing 2010). Introducing 
a Western-style politically neutral civil service was briefly considered in the 1980s but was 
not implemented because separating the Party and the government would have reduced the 
Party’s ability to influence personnel decisions and to ensure stability in the administration 
(Podger and Chan 2015). Provincial leaders can demonstrate their loyalty to the Communist 
Party by encouraging subordinates to support the new political priority of environmental 
protection even though this may hurt provincial economic growth (Hart, Jiayan, and Jiahui 
2019). 
Lu (2015, 211) noted that in the Chinese public sector, “networking with stakeholders 
outside the government, in particular, citizens, media and or nonprofit organizations, is 
historically not common.” Encouraging civil servants to establish relationships through 
network governance leadership is important as Chinese water resource and environmental 
agencies increasingly collaborate with other ministries and actors in designing and delivering 
public services (Hart, Jiayan, and Jiahui 2019). The 2015 Plan on Environmental Monitoring 
Network Construction was enacted to improve the accuracy of environmental data and to 
facilitate information exchange and cooperation among organizations (Linster and Yang 
2018).  
All four PSM dimensions (Kim and Vandenabeele 2010; Kim et al. 2013) are very 
relevant in a Chinese water resource and environmental policy context. Attraction to public 
participation is relevant due to civil servants’ opportunities to contribute to environmental 
policy making and program implementation that reduce pollution. Commitment to public 
values emphasizes civic duty and a calling for the continuous provision of equitable and 
ethical public service that protects the environment for future generations. Compassion 
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relates to the affective bonding with specific individuals and groups such as citizens suffering 
from water and air pollution. Finally, self-sacrifice encompasses the willingness to forgo 
tangible personal rewards to help the environment. 
 
Methods 
Sample and Procedures 
We collected the data for this study from civil servants working in a water resource bureau 
and an environmental bureau in a prefecture-level (below the provincial and above the county 
level) city in China’s Shandong province. The bureaus can be categorized as people-
processing negative service providers (Van Loon, Leisink, and Vandenabeele 2013) that deal 
with many users and prohibit certain behavior, such as pollution, for the greater good. These 
bureaus monitor compliance with water and environmental laws for multiple organizations; 
they provide unwanted services because the users are the organizations whose compliance 
with environmental rules and regulations is investigated and not the general public that 
benefits from safer water and air. The bureaus supported our study and encouraged their 
employees to participate in our survey. All participating employees had a close working 
relationship with their immediate supervisors. All questionnaires were translated from 
English into Chinese following Brislin’s (1993) back-translation procedure. Before the 
questionnaires were distributed, the prospective respondents were told that participation was 
voluntary and that their individual responses would be confidential and would not be shared 
with their bureaus.  
Data were collected in three phases. At time one, employees rated the accountability, 
rule-following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership behaviors of their 
immediate supervisors and provided demographic information. One month later, at time two, 
all employees who completed the first questionnaire were invited to rate their own PSM 
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level. At time three, another month later, their immediate supervisors were asked to rate the 
job performance of each employee. The supervisors also provided their own demographic 
information.  
 In total, 300 employees working in 64 teams completed both questionnaires. Teams 
had between 3 and 9 members (M = 4.94; SD = 1.18). The average age of the participants 
was 34 (M = 34.02; SD = 5.75), 53% were female, and 79% had at least a college degree. On 
average, the employees had been working for the organization for six years (M = 5.91; SD = 
3.39) and for their current supervisor for an average of nearly four years (M = 3.84; SD = 
2.47). The average age of the supervisors was 42 (M = 41.99; SD = 4.97), and 42% were 
female. Exactly three-quarters of the supervisors had a college degree. The supervisors had 
been working for their organizations for almost 14 years on average (M = 13.64; SD = 4.80) 
and had held their present positions for an average of 10 years (M = 9.87; SD = 3.80). The 
response rate was 63%. 
 
Measures  
The study utilized multi-item scales that have been validated in previous studies. Each of the 
items was measured using a 5-point Likert scale with 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly 
agree. 
Leadership was measured with the four public leadership scales developed by 
Tummers and Knies (2016). A full list of items can be found in table 1.  
PSM was measured using the five-item Merit Systems Protection Board scale adapted 
from the original 40 items by Perry (1996). This scale has been used extensively in prior 
research (Naff and Crum 1999; Wright, Christensen, and Pandey 2013) and specifically with 
samples from China (e.g., Miao et al. 2018; Schwarz et al. 2016). A sample item includes: 
“Meaningful public service is very important to me.”  
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Individual job performance was measured using a three-item scale created by Lam, 
Chen and Schaubroeck (2002). A sample item includes: “This employee has performed 
his/her job well.”  
The control variables were selected based on their respective impact on job 
performance in previous research. For example, studies have shown that the age (Van Loon 
2017), education (Tummers 2017), and gender (Pitts 2009) of employees have an influence 
on their performance rating. Tenure is often used a proxy for work experience, with 
employees who spend more time under a leader or in a team accumulating more relevant 
skills and performing their job at a higher level (Lavigna 1992). Thus, at the individual level, 
employees’ demographic characteristics were used as control variables and included age, 
gender, education, tenure under their supervisor, and tenure at the organization. At the team 
level, the demographics of the leader and team size were used as controls because meta-
analytical evidence demonstrates that the traits of a leader (Derue et al. 2011) and team size 
(Stewart 2006) can influence employees’ performance. 
 
Analysis of the Public Leadership Scales  
As the public leadership measures have only been validated once, in the Netherlands 
(Tummers and Knies 2016), we conducted a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs), 
calculated their internal consistency, and examined their multilevel properties. CFAs are used 
to test whether the measures of the four public leadership constructs are consistent with the 
theory.  
First, we ran a single-level CFA on the four public leadership measures using a 
maximum likelihood estimation on MPlus. As shown in table 1, all items loaded strongly 
onto their corresponding factor. The measurement model showed good fit for the data at the 
individual level χ2 (df = 183) = 325.54, RMSEA = .051 (90% CI [.042 .060]), TLI = .952, 
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CFI = .958, SRMR = .049. As the four latent variables were conceptualized as related 
constructs in the original work on public leadership (Tummers and Knies 2016), we 
conducted a second-order CFA to verify the loadings of each of the four latent measures on a 
larger ‘public service leadership’ measure. The results of the measurement model indicated a 
good fit to the data, χ2 (df = 185) = 325.83, RMSEA = .050 (90% CI [.041 .059]), TLI = .953, 
CFI = .958, SRMR = .049, with the factor loadings ranging from .424 to .803. Consistent 
with Tummers and Knies (2016), political loyalty leadership was the weakest loading latent 
variable. Thus, our results confirm the factor structure of the four public service leadership 
measures. We also conducted a two-level CFA to determine the distinctness of the measures 
at the team level. The two-level measurement model showed good fit for the data, χ2 (df= 
366) = 726.28, RMSEA = .057, TLI = .903, CFI = .916, SRMR = .049. 
Second, we assessed the public leadership scales’ reliabilities by examining their 
Cronbach’s alphas at the individual and team levels. All four public leadership scales 
demonstrated high reliability (see table 1).  
 Third, to determine whether the scales can be analyzed at the team level, we 
calculated the interclass correlations (ICCs). ICC(1) and ICC(2) were generally acceptable 
for each of the leadership measures; however, the ICC(2) for accountability leadership was 
weaker than the others. ICC(2) values can often be affected by small group sizes, as observed 
in this sample (M = 4.68), and in these cases, LeBreton and Senter (2008) argue that ICC 
alone should not be used to justify aggregation. Therefore, we calculated the median rWGJ 
values to ascertain whether there were high levels of within-group agreement (James, 
Demaree, and Wolf 1984). Using a uniform null distribution, the median rWGJ values were 
strong for each of the public leadership scales. Taking these results together with the ICC 
values and the theoretical justification for aggregating the measures to the team level, each of 
the public leadership measures are aggregated in further analyses.  
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 [Table 1 here] 
 
Method of Analysis  
As the data were nested within teams, multilevel modeling using a maximum likelihood 
method with robust standard errors was used. Multilevel modeling is appropriate for nested 
data where the assumption of independence of observations is violated (Raudenbush and 
Bryk 2002). To test for the mediation effects, we performed multilevel structural equation 
modeling in Mplus following the recommendations of Preacher and Hayes (2008). To 
construct the confidence intervals for the indirect effects of the mediation, we used the Monte 
Carlo method of confidence interval construction with the recommended 20,000 replications 
(Preacher and Selig 2012). The Monte Carlo method is a flexible model for estimating 
confidence intervals around the indirect effects when bootstrapping is not feasible, such as 
with complex multilevel data (Preacher and Selig 2012). To confirm the criterion-related 
validity of the public leadership measures independently, we tested each measure in separate 
models. 
 
Results  
Common Method Variance and Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
We applied both procedural and methodological remedies to address potential issues with 
common method variance in our study (Andersen, Heinesen, and Pedersen 2016). First, we 
applied a number of procedural remedies informed by the common method variance literature 
(George and Pandey 2017; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, and Podsakoff 2012). This process 
included using different respondents for the independent and dependent variables (i.e., 
supervisor and subordinates); using multiple raters on the leadership variables (i.e., multiple 
subordinates per supervisor); temporal separation of the measures (i.e., the variables were 
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measured at three different points in time that were one month apart); ensuring the 
questionnaires were anonymous; reducing the ambiguity of questions by only using pre-
established measures; and counterbalancing the questions (randomized order).  
 Second, we conducted two statistical remedies to determine whether common method 
variance is affecting our results. The first is a marker variable technique (Lindell and 
Whitney 2001), where a variable that is theoretically unrelated to the model is used as a 
“marker” or surrogate for common method variance. We used the position of the employee in 
the organization as the marker variable as there is not a theoretical reason why position 
should be related to the leadership of their manager or the outcome variables. The smallest 
observed correlation between the marker variable and the variables used in this study was r 
= .001, p = .982. As the correlations are weak and non-significant, this suggests that there is 
not a substantial amount of common method variance in this study (Lindell and Whitney 
2001).   
The second statistical remedy was to run a CFA to establish the discriminant validity 
of the public leadership, PSM, and job performance measures to test whether each of the 
latent variables was measuring distinct constructs within the model (a variation of Harman’s 
single factor test). First, the observed variables were loaded onto their six respective latent 
factors (accountability, rule-following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership, 
PSM, and job performance). The six-factor measurement model demonstrated a very good fit 
to the data, χ2 (df= 362) = 609.09, RMSEA = .048 (90% CI [.041, .054]), TLI = .933, CFI 
= .940, SRMR = .053. An alternate three-factor model in which all four leadership measures 
(accountability, rule-following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership) were 
loaded onto the same factor, yielded a worse fit, χ2 (df= 374) = 2067.535, RMSEA = .123 
(90% CI [.118, .128], TLI = .553, CFI = .588, SRMR = .114. A one-factor model, where all 
observed variables were loaded onto a single factor, also produced a worse fitting model, χ2 
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(df= 377) = 2662.584, RMSEA = .142 (90% CI [.137, .147], TLI = .401, CFI = .444, SRMR 
= .129. These results provide evidence for the distinctness of the measures used in this study 
as the best fitting model was the one in which the observed variables were modeled onto their 
respective six latent factors used in the hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, bivariate correlations, and alphas of the 
study variables. Hypotheses 1a-1d suggested that each of the four public leadership 
approaches would be related to higher PSM levels among employees. As predicted, 
accountability leadership (β = .31, p < .01), rule-following leadership (β = .31, p < .01), 
political loyalty leadership (β = .18, p < .05), and network governance leadership (β = .47, p 
< .01) all were significantly positively related to employee PSM.  
 Hypotheses 2a-2d predicted that each of the four public leadership approaches would 
be positively related to employees’ job performance indirectly through increasing employees’ 
PSM. As shown in table 3, PSM mediated the relationship between political loyalty 
leadership and job performance (indirect effect = .04 (95% CI [.000, .091)). This result 
indicated that when PSM was present in the model, there was no relationship between 
political loyalty leadership and job performance. PSM partially mediated the relationship 
between accountability leadership and job performance (indirect effect = .06 (95% CI 
[.013, .126])), rule-following leadership and job performance (indirect effect = .06 (95% CI 
[.012, .134])), and network governance leadership and job performance (indirect effect = .10 
(95% CI [.026, .179])).  
[Table 2 here] 
 
 [Table 3 here] 
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To determine whether one of the leadership approaches was a better predictor of PSM 
and, subsequently, individual job performance than other leadership approaches, we analyzed 
the four public leadership measures simultaneously. As shown in table 4, when analyzed 
simultaneously, network governance leadership was the only public leadership approach that 
was still significantly related to PSM (β = .46, p < .01) and, subsequently, follower job 
performance when all four public leadership approaches were included in the model (.10 
(95% CI [.026, .180])). We also created a second-order latent factor, public leadership, 
composed of all four public leadership approaches. This factor was found to be significantly 
related to PSM (β = .79, p < .01) and, subsequently, job performance (.14 (95% CI 
[.035, .264])).  
 [Table 4 here] 
 
Discussion 
Based on three-wave data gathered from 300 Chinese civil servants and their 64 direct 
supervisors, our study demonstrates that accountability, rule-following, political loyalty, and 
network governance leadership are significantly positively related to the job performance of 
civil servants through the mediating mechanism of PSM. In line with social learning theory 
(Bandura 1977), our findings suggest that supervisors act as role models for their employees 
to follow, which helps to foster higher levels of PSM among their employees. In turn, by 
having higher levels of PSM, employees are more likely to perform better in their day-to-day 
public service roles (Schwarz et al. 2016). Therefore, this study makes a number of 
contributions to our understanding of public leadership.  
 
Theoretical Implications 
Our research extends previous work by Tummers and Knies (2016) by being the first study to 
analyze the relationship among the four public leadership approaches and both PSM and job 
 20 
performance. We extend the nomological network of PSM and job performance by 
identifying public leadership as an antecedent of both constructs, providing new insights into 
the complex PSM-performance relationship (Schott, Van Cleef, and Steen 2015). Based on a 
study conducted with methodological rigor (i.e., drawing on two source and multi-time point 
data), we have been able to establish the distinctiveness, predictive validity, multilevel 
properties, and discriminant validity of the four public leadership approaches in a novel 
context, the Chinese public sector. We now have more confidence that the four public 
leadership measures work adequately and can be used in future studies. 
The current study also contributes to the understanding of social learning theory in the 
public sector context. As social learning theory posits, followers need to observe others to 
emulate them (Bandura 1977). Therefore, it is important for public leaders to actively engage 
their followers. For example, when making decisions, having discussions with followers 
about how these decisions increase accountability, how they are following governmental 
regulations, and how they are demonstrating political loyalty should strengthen the social 
learning process between these approaches to public leadership and followers’ PSM. 
The fact that network governance leadership was found to have the strongest 
relationship with PSM and job performance demonstrates the importance of “treating 
networks seriously” (O’Toole 1997, 45). O’Leary, Choi, and Gerard (2012, 70) noted that 
much of the research on networks focuses on organizations, “with the role of the individual in 
collaborations receiving limited attention.” Our research demonstrates the important role that 
leaders play in improving PSM and job performance when they encourage their employees to 
establish informal linkages with employees in other organizations and to collaborate on a 
regular basis with people from their networks. By doing so, these leaders turn their 
employees into boundary spanners (Williams 2002). Networking allows the boundary 
spanners to exchange information, for example, about the perspectives, interests, values, 
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constraints, and preferred outcomes of important stakeholders and to generate external 
support (Kapucu 2006). Establishing personal relationships with people outside the 
department enables employees to identify areas of communality and interdependency and to 
improve performance by combining strengths (Hall and Battaglio 2018; Williams 2002).  
In an “age of networks and collaboration” (McGuire 2006, 34), a “collaboration 
imperative” (Kettl 2006, 10) exists because no single organization has the financial resources, 
problem-solving capacities, knowledge, and legitimacy to tackle wicked problems (Weber 
and Khademian 2008). To deal with complexities, public organizations need to coordinate 
their strategic moves with diverse stakeholders, such as other public agencies, private firms, 
and nonprofit service providers, who frequently adhere to different institutional logics and 
perceptions (Mosley and Sharpe 2019). In this type of environment, the traditional 
hierarchical forms of government and New Public Management prescriptions that were 
intended to make bureaucracies more efficient and effective are not sufficient (Klijn and 
Koppenjan 2016). As a consequence, the three other public leadership approaches that refer 
to the traditional-legal authority of a bureaucratic system had a weaker relationship with job 
performance than network governance leadership.  
The results also revealed that political loyalty leadership exhibited a weaker 
relationship with PSM (β = .18) than the other three leadership approaches, and it was the 
only leadership approach that was not related to job performance when PSM was in the 
model. Our findings are consistent with Tummers and Knies’ (2016) original study, in which 
political loyalty leadership had a weaker influence on all tested individual-level constructs 
(organizational commitment, work engagement, turnover intentions, organizational 
citizenship behaviors, and job satisfaction) than the other three public leadership approaches. 
We concur with Tummers and Knies that political loyalty leadership may have a greater 
influence on organizational outcomes, such as effective public policy execution, than on 
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individual-level work outcomes because political loyalty may contradict an employee’s own 
values and preferences, e.g., for even more rigorous environmental standards that favor other 
stakeholders. 
 
Practical Implications 
As public leadership was positively related to performance in the current study, public sector 
organizations could provide training that helps supervisors at all levels to develop and display 
these leadership approaches. Combining classroom instruction with coaching, the provision 
of multisource feedback and experiential training has been found to be a particularly helpful 
training method to improve leadership and organizational outcomes (Seidle, Fernandez, and 
Perry 2016). 
Motivating employees to invest time and energy in the development and maintenance 
of relationships outside their organization seems to be particularly important for Chinese 
public leaders because employees may hesitate to do so without being told. Lu (2015) found 
that Chinese civil servants have very limited connections with contacts outside their 
organization. On average, they only had outward contact once every three months. Our 
research demonstrates the importance of encouraging employees to interact with people in 
other organizations. Relationship orientation is an important principle in Confucianism and 
“guanxi” (Chinese for relationship or connection), which plays an important role in Chinese 
society (Ni and Zhan 2017). Once guanxi is established, there is a reciprocal obligation to 
deal with requests, which translates into higher job performance as it provides access to 
information and resources.  
This outward focus of the civil servants is particularly important as recent reforms 
aim at involving a broader set of organizations in public policy formulation and 
implementation (Ni and Zhan 2017). Whereas earlier reforms were focused on internal 
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capacity building to ensure that the civil service can keep up with economic development, 
power sharing and participation have garnered support as the means to provide legitimacy 
and higher citizen satisfaction (Xue and Liou 2012). Hensengerth and Lu (2019, 122) noted 
that “China, recognizing the severity of environmental degradation and the need to improve 
environmental governance to avert crises, the central government has introduced legislation 
for public participation in environmental decision-making.” As the Chinese government still 
lacks experience and expertise in managing networks (Lu 2015), it is essential that 
supervisors in public agencies encourage their employees to initiate and maintain 
relationships with contacts outside their organizations. To avoid abuses, leaders should also 
articulate the boundaries of networking activities. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Although our article contributes to the understanding of the relationship among public 
leadership, PSM, and performance, it is not without limitations. Our research design does not 
allow causal conclusions. Future research should use panel data with experimental variation 
of the public leadership approaches, e.g., through the random assignment to groups that 
receive different leadership interventions (e.g., Bellé 2014). Additionally, while we collected 
data from two sources across three time points separated by one month each, we cannot 
completely rule out that common method variance exists in our study as the leadership 
variables and PSM were measured from the same source (Andersen, Heinesen, and Pedersen 
2016). Future research should employ longer time intervals between the data collection points 
and measure the same variables across multiple time points (George and Pandey 2017). 
As Tummers and Knies’ (2016) public leadership construct is relatively novel, we 
suggest that qualitative research be conducted to shed light on the extent to which public 
leaders act as role models. Future studies should also examine the distinctiveness of public 
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leadership from established leadership approaches, such as transformational and transactional 
leadership (Jacobsen and Andersen 2015). We also suggest measuring leaders’ PSM in future 
research on public leadership as the motivations of the leader may influence their leadership 
approaches and follower PSM (see Van Loon 2016; Wright, Hassan, and Park 2016). 
Considering the small size of the R2 value in this study, which examines leadership alone, 
understanding the interactions between public leadership and its environment to elicit 
performance should be of great interest.   
Finally, we conducted our study in a water resource bureau and an environmental 
bureau. Both Agranoff (2007) and Klijn and Koppenjan (2016) use water and environment as 
examples of wicked problems that require the collaboration of multiple actors. Hence, the 
strong links between PSM, individual job performance, and networked governance leadership 
may be influenced by the type of organizations that we examined. Future studies may test our 
model in more traditional agencies and with samples with different educational backgrounds. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the relationship among four public leadership 
approaches and both PSM and job performance. Based on dyadic data collected at three time 
points from Chinese civil servants and their supervisors, we found that accountability, rule-
following, political loyalty, and network governance leadership approaches were significantly 
positively related to the PSM levels of followers, which in turn were significantly positively 
associated with higher levels of job performance. Network governance leadership was found 
to have the strongest relationship with both PSM and job performance, suggesting that 
managers should encourage their employees to nurture connections with contacts outside 
their organizations. Our results demonstrate the important performance-enhancing capacities 
of leadership.  
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Table 1 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Individual) of Public Leadership  
Items Factor Loadings 
Second-Order 
CFA Loadings 
Individual / 
Team Alphas 
ICC(1) 
ICC(2) 
Median 
rWGJ 
Accountability Leadership  .745 .91, .93  .12, .40 .94 
Encourages me and my colleagues to explain our actions to various stakeholders. .689     
Encourages us to inform stakeholders of our way of working. .809     
Provides us with the opportunity to explain our behavior to stakeholders. .831     
Emphasizes that it is important that we answer questions from clients. .810     
Strives to ensure that we openly and honestly share the actions of our organizational unit with 
others. .758 
    
Encourages us to explain to stakeholders why certain decisions were taken. .808     
      
Rule-following Leadership  .649 .91, .95 .29, .65 .92 
Emphasizes to me and my colleagues that it is important to follow the law. .838     
Gives me and my colleagues the means to properly follow governmental rules and regulations. .853     
Emphasizes that my colleagues and I should carry out government policies properly. .874     
Ensures that we accurately follow the rules and procedures. .828     
      
Political Loyalty Leadership  .424 .89, .91 .27, .61 .92 
Encourages me and my colleagues to support political decisions, even when other stakeholders 
confront us with it. .801 
    
Encourages me and my colleagues not to jeopardize the relationship with political heads, even if 
that entails risks. .780 
    
Encourages me and my colleagues to implement political decisions, even if that means 
undertaking additional responsibilities. .858 
    
Encourages me and my colleagues to defend political choices, even if we see shortcomings. .743     
Encourages me and my colleagues to support political decisions, even when we see downsides. .757     
      
Network Governance Leadership  .803 .78. .85 .29, .65 .94 
Encourages me and my colleagues to maintain many contacts with other organizations. .536     
Encourages me and my colleagues to invest substantial energy in the development of new 
contacts. .706 
    
Motivates me and my colleagues to regularly work together with people from our networks. .524     
Motivates me and my colleagues to develop many contacts with people outside our own 
department. .673 
    
Encourages me and my colleagues to introduce others to contacts of our own networks. .677     
Encourages me and my colleagues to be a ‘linchpin’ between different organizations. .548     
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Table 2 Means, Standard Deviations, Reliabilities and Correlations among the Study Variables 
 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 Team Level           
1 Supervisor Age 41.99 4.97 -        
2 Supervisor Gender a 1.42 0.50 -.06 -       
3 Supervisor Education b 2.28 0.84 -.12 -.02 -      
4 Team Size 4.69 1.10 -.06 .04 .05 -     
5 Accountability Leadership 3.49 0.38 .10 -.02 .04 .00 (.93)    
6 Rule-following Leadership 3.81 0.56 .29* -.01 -.12 .02 .68** (.95)   
7 Political Loyalty Leadership 3.39 0.54 .05 -.10 .20 -.11 .37** .39** (.91)  
8 Network Governance Leadership 3.74 0.41 .07 -.03 .16 .11 .62** .53** .18 (.85) 
            
 Individual Level           
1 Age (years) 34.02 5.75 -        
2 Gender a 1.53 0.50 .02 -       
3 Education b 2.31 1.23 -.07 -.01 -      
4 Tenure under the leader (years) 3.84 2.47 .54 -.10 -.07 -     
5 Organizational tenure (years) 5.91 3.39 .60 -.10 -.07 .78** -    
6 Public Service Motivation 3.96 0.67 -.01 -.03 .08 .04 .01 (.82)   
7 Individual Job Performance 3.99 0.65 -.01 .01 .02 -.02 -.07 .26** (.81)  
N = 300 for individual level variables; N = 64 for team level variables. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients on the diagonal.  
a Gender coded: 1 = male; 2 = female  
b Education coded: 1 = high school, 2 = undergraduate, 3 = master’s degree, 4 = technical college.   
 32 
Table 3 Results of Multilevel Mediation Analysis 
  Accountability  
Leadership 
Rule-following  
Leadership 
Political Loyalty  
Leadership 
Network Governance 
Leadership 
  PSM Performance PSM Performance PSM Performance PSM Performance 
Within (Level 1)          
          
Age   -.03 .04 -.05 .03 -.03 .04 -.03 .04 
Gender   -.03 -.02 -.04 -.02 -.02 -.01 -.01 -.01 
Education   .03 -.02 .03 -.01 .04 -.01 .02 -.01 
Tenure under Leader  .09 .07 .09 .06 .08 .06 .07 .06 
Organizational Tenure   -.06 -.16 -.04 -.15 -.04 -.14 -.04 -.14 
          
Public Service Motivation   .20**  .20**  .20**  .21** 
          
Between (Level 2)          
          
Supervisor Age  .07 .01 .02 -.02 .09 .02 .06 .01 
Supervisor Gender   .01 -.03 .01 -.03 .02 -.02 .02 -.02 
Supervisor Education   .00 -.09 .04 -.07 -.02 -.09 -.06 -.11* 
Team Size  .15 .07 .15 .07 .18 .08 .11 .05 
          
Accountability Leadership  .31** .20*       
Rule-following Leadership    .31** .18*     
Political Loyalty Leadership      .18* .05   
Network Governance Leadership        .47** .20* 
          
Standardized Indirect Effect  .06  95% CI [.013, .126] 
.06  
95% CI [.012, .134] 
.04  
95% CI [.000, .091] 
.10  
95% CI [.026, .179] 
          
R2  .14 .09 .11 .11 .06 .09 .29 .10 
N = 300 for within level; N = 64 for between level; * p < .05, ** p < .01.  
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Table 4 Results of Simultaneous Analysis of the Public Leadership Approaches 
  Four Leadership Approaches in a Single Model Combined Public Leadership Factor 
  Public Service Motivation Individual Performance Public Service Motivation Individual Performance 
Within (Level 1)      
      
Age   -.03 .03 -.06 .03 
Gender   -.02 -.02 -.05 -.02 
Education   .02 -.02 .02 -.02 
Tenure under Leader  .08 .06 .11 .07 
Organizational Tenure   -.05 -.15 -.08 -.17 
      
Public Service Motivation   .21**  .18** 
      
Between (Level 2)      
      
Supervisor Age  .06 -.01 .06 -.03 
Supervisor Gender   .03 -.03 .02 -.07 
Supervisor Education   -.09 -.10 -.03 -.27 
Team Size  .12 .05 .22 .16 
      
Accountability Leadership  .01 .11 - - 
Rule-following Leadership  -.03 .06 - - 
Political Loyalty Leadership  .12 -.02 - - 
Network Governance Leadership  .46** .10 - - 
      
Combined Public Leadership Factor    .79** .67* 
      
R2  .30 .11 .22 .10 
N = 300 for within level; N = 64 for between level; * p < .05, ** p < .01.  
 
 34 
Appendix 1 Items and Factor Loadings for Public Service Motivation and Job Performance 
Items Factor Loadings 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Public Service Motivation  .82 
Meaningful public service is very important to me. .655  
I am often reminded by daily events about how dependent we are on one another. .738  
Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.  .698  
I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society. .697  
I am not afraid to go to bat for the rights of others even if it means I will be 
ridiculed .661 
 
  .81 
Individual Job Performance   
He/she is very competent .793  
He/she gets his/her work done very effectively .822  
He/she has performed his/her job well .709  
 
